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The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a growth in the use of 
information within firms throughout the industrialised nations. In her survey of this 
phenomenon in American businesses, Yates (1989, 1994) has stressed the importance not 
only of technological developments in relation to the office and the growing size of 
businesses, but also the growth of management ideology. In her study of the tableau de 
bord in France, Pezet (2009) has drawn attention to certain parallels between 
developments in the USA and France. This paper explores the extent to which 
developments in managerial control in Britain mirrored developments in these two 
countries. It is found that there were important similarities in timing and motivation, 
though differences in the precise approach championed. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A central issue for any business, however large or small, is how is it to be controlled. In 
all companies there will be chief executive, a person who is ultimately responsible for 
making key decisions regarding the day-to-day operations of the business and making 
sure that the business follows the strategy laid down, whether this be determined by the 
chief executive or a board of directors. Efficient and effective control of a business, 
however, requires that the chief executive receives relevant data in a timely fashion, but 
what sort of data, and when? These were questions which increasingly exercised the 
minds not only of businessmen but also of a growing number of writers and 
commentators on management issues at the end of the nineteenth century and into the 
first half of the twentieth century. To date, a detailed study of this issue has been carried 
out in the USA by Yates (1989), while in a recent journal article, Pezet (2009) has 
considered the matter in France. This paper extends the geographical spread of such 
analyses by examining the case of Britain. 
This paper is very much of an exploratory nature, and attempts to bring together 
various pieces of information which have been collected in an unsystematic manner as 
part of earlier research into other related topics. Some attempt has been made to fill in 
certain gaps, but much additional research needs to be carried out in order to tighten up 
the analysis and further develop the ideas expressed in this paper. The paper is structured 
as follows. In section 2 we briefly summarise the prior literature on the development of 
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examination of developments in Britain between the late nineteenth century and c.1960, 
where the focus will be on two important issues: the extent to which business decision-
makers utilised statistics (both financial and non-financial) and the extent to which 
graphical methods and/or charts were employed for purposes of control. These issues will 
be examined both from the points of view of the literature and actual practice in British 
firms. In section 4, special attention is paid to a specific method of control championed 
by T.G. Rose, namely, Higher Control. Having set out the details of this method, its 
relationship with budgetary control and the tableau de bord method are considered in 
section 5. Our initial conclusions are presented in the final section of the paper. 
 
 
2.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGERIAL CONTROL IN THE USA AND 
FRANCE 
 
2.1  The USA 
 
During the latter decades of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth 
century, many countries experienced the rise of a new ideological approach to the issue 
of running a business, namely the systematic approach to management.
1 In the USA, 
Yates (1994) sees this ideological development as having played a key role in the 
growing adoption of the use of information within businesses for the purpose of control. 
While the development of technology, e.g. typewriters, pre-printed forms, duplicating 
equipment, storing and retrieval systems (e.g. vertical and card filing), analytical 
machines (e.g. tabulating, adding and calculating machines such as the Hollerith
2) and 
presentational devices, clearly played an important role in the wider use of information, 
as did the growing size of businesses, in Yates‟ opinion these two factors alone are not 
sufficient to explain the full extent of the revolutionary growth in the use of information 
in American firms between 1880 and 1920. For Yates (1994, 47): 
 
  The systematic management ideology, with the premium it placed on managing 
through written information, reinforced the adoption of new devices and 
techniques, which in turn reinforced the ideology by reducing the cost and 
increasing the symbolic attractiveness of following it. 
 
It was not, however, simply in terms of written information that change occurred. 
Busy businessmen found that, from the perspective of conveying large amounts of 
statistical information quickly and effectively, graphs had distinct advantages over tables, 
and while graphs had been used outside of business for at least a century, they gained 
increasing popularity within American business through the advocacy of systematisers 
and engineers-turned-managers (Yates 1994, 36). Graphs represented a simple and 
                                                 
1 Yates warns her readers not to confuse this „broad but amorphous‟ movement with the much more 
narrowly focused scientific management movement associated largely with F.W. Taylor (Yates 1994, 47 
fn.40). 
2 On the link between the growth of big business and the need for increased information flows in the US 
see Chandler (1977), and on the growth of this demand and the mechanization of accounting in the US, see 
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effective way to “make the information gathered and analysed available to decision-
makers in an efficient and compelling form. As with forms and vertical filing, 
systematizers associated graphs with „modern methods‟” (Yates 1994, 36). Parsons, the 
author of an early American text on Business Administration in 1909, put it thus: “In a 
modern organization the executive obtains [operating] information through a system of 
graphic records, a simplified summary of countless departmental statistics and itemized 
reports” (quoted in Yates 1994, 36). 
  According to Yates (1994), until the advent of the computer after the Second 
World War ushered in another period of rapid change, most of the transformation in the 
use of information begun in the late nineteenth century had run its course in the USA by 
1920, with only slow, incremental changes occurring over the next three decades. What 
did occur during the interwar decades, particularly within some of the largest firms in the 
USA was the development of budgeting, or as it was more often called across the 
Atlantic, budgetary control. The extent to which budgeting really caught on in the USA is 
still a subject about which too little is known, but it clearly made inroads in a number of 
large American corporations by the Second World War (Chandler, 1977). Budgeting, 
however, was a significant development since it represented a method of controlling such 
businesses through financial numbers, but it did not especially make use of graphical 
methods of presenting them. In a recent study, Chandar and Miranti (2009) have shown 
how, during the 1920s, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company integrated the 




2.2  France 
 
France, like the USA and Britain, was touched by both the systematic and scientific 
managerial revolutions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, similar signs of development in the use of information can be discerned as 
occurred in the USA. In her recent study, Pezet (2009) sees many of these developments 
as being precursors to, first, the practical development and, second, the conceptualisation 
of the tableau de bord concept. Pezet (2009) argues that there have been four distinct 
phases in the development of this concept in France, the first two of these mirroring, 
though possibly with a lag, the developments associated with systematic management 
observed in the USA by Yates. Focusing her study on developments at three large firms, 
Saint-Gobain, Alais, Froges et Camargue (later Pechiney) and Lafarge, Pezet finds, at the 
end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, an emerging use of 
written reports which she has characterised as “narrating the running of factories” (2009, 
106). During the interwar years there emerged a number of both complementary and 
competing methods for assisting managerial control: statistics, tableaux de bord and 
budgets. The use of statistics on sales, production, etc. to complement financial data was 
suggested in some quarters, though Pezet notes that budgetary control tended to be 
favoured over the tableau de bord method, notably by writers such as Satet (1936). 
Because of this, it was only after the Second World War, especially during the 1950s and 
1960s, that Pezet finds the true emergence of tableaux de bord. These decades witnessed 
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organisation, but also a “theorisation of the device” (Pezet 2009, 111). In the fourth and 
final period, since the 1960s, Pezet suggests that the tableau de bord has seen a “rapid 
slide towards a reporting device of a financial nature” (2009, 106). 
  Each new phase in the development of the tableau de bord has been marked by a 
significant shift compared to the previous phase. That between the first and second 
phases, for example, was marked by the widespread use of statistics, more particularly, in 
a forward-looking manner. Written, narrative reports from the first phase often included 
some data, as at Lafarge from 1905 onwards, but the data were originally dispersed 
throughout such reports rather than being presented in a systematic manner, and were 
inevitably of a backward-looking kind, recalling what had happened during the period 
being reported on. The use of data as a means for generating forecasts, as in budgetary 
control, for example, became an important focus of attention during the 1920s, when 
statistics began to be brought together in a consistent manner at companies like Alais, 
Froges et Camargue, often assisted by the utilisation of tabulating machines.
3 There was 
also an increasing focus on commercial statistics, with Satet (1936), in his work on 
budgetary control, recommending the collection by those controlling a company of a 
wide variety of statistics, ranging from commercial, through industrial, to financial. Pezet 
(2009, 108) suggests that in this “we can see the first outlines of a tableau de bord” with 
Satet implying “strong complementarities between statistics and budgeting, making the 
former the prerequisite for the latter to exist”.  
  It is clear, however, that statistics were seen as something different from, and 
additional to, accounting information. The head of the financial department at Alais, 
Froges et Camargue in 1948, for example, clearly distinguished between financial 
accounting data and statistics (see Pezet 2009, 108). While it might be considered that 
such a view represented a reflection of the traditional standpoint of French accountants 
that any data generated outside of the accounting system was inevitably inaccurate 
(Berland et al, 2002), it has its echoes elsewhere in Europe. Thus, the most significant 
Italian theorist of the interwar period, Gino Zappa, referred to cost accounting as 
„statistics‟, distinguishing it from financial accounting which was seen by him as the only 
true accounting. The development of the tableau de bord concept in France, however, 
involved not just changes in the use of statistics but also in developments in their mode of 
presentation. Most evident amongst the changes here was the use of charts or graphs to 
present data in a more visual form, as occurred, for example, at Lafarge in the 1960s 
(Pezet 2009, 115-116). 
   
The brief overviews presented above have revealed a number of important issues 
associated with the development of managerial control in the USA and France. Amongst 
these are the following: (1) the growth in the use of information, and especially statistical 
data; (2) changes in the relative importance of financial and non-financial data for control 
purposes at different times; (3) the use of visual means of presenting the data through the 
use of graphs or charts; and (4), in France, the inter-relationship between statistics, 
budgetary control and the tableau de bord. The similarities that can be observed in 
developments in France and America, together with the existence of archival evidence 
showing that managers of French companies knew of developments across the Atlantic, 
has led Pezet to question whether or not the tableau de bord is truly a French 
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phenomenon. This echoes a comment made earlier by Lebas (1996, 90) who claimed that 
“The notion of Tableau de Bord is neither totally new nor exclusively French”, going on 
to suggest that “the decomposition of ROI [return on investment] into its constituent 
factors used at Dupont de Nemours [in the USA in the early twentieth century] 
represented an approach coherent with that of Tableau de Bord”. In the light of such 
suggestions that developments in the USA and France may not have been totally 
independent of one another, this paper seeks to provide another perspective on this issue 
by examining developments in approaches to managerial control in Britain between 
c.1880 and c.1960. 
 
 
3.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGERIAL CONTROL IN BRITAIN TO 
C.1940 
 
3.1  Developments in the literature 
 
It is not entirely clear when the use of statistics and graphs as regular tools of managerial 
control began to be championed in Britain, but books advocating their use began to 
emerge in Britain around the time of the First World War. However, even during the 
interwar years, the number of books on these issues was somewhat limited, though there 
were clear signs of a developing management movement in Britain at this time, building 
on the systematic management movement and, in some cases, Taylor‟s concept of 
scientific management. A search of the British Library integrated catalogue reveals that 
many of the books published between the two world wars on the subject of graphs were 
for educational use in schools, colleges and universities, and not designed to be read by 
businessmen. One such book, originally published by Prentice-Hall in America in 1923, 
was Charts and Graphs: An Introduction to Graphic Methods in the Control and 
Analysis of Statistics, by the American, Karl G. Karsten. A British edition of Karsten‟s 
work was published in 1924 by Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd., and this book was to have 
an important influence on Thomas Gerald Rose, one of the few British authors to write on 
the topic of charts in business. Karsten‟s work, however, had been pre-dated in Britain by 
the appearance of A. Risdon Palmer‟s work, The Use of Graphs in Commerce and 
Industry in 1921. This work, published by G. Bell, represented volume 3 of Bell‟s 
Handbooks of Commerce and Finance series. No other books were published on the topic 
by British authors during the 1920s, but it would appear that works by two further 
Americans, John R. Riggleman, Graphic Methods for Presenting Business 
Statistics(McGraw-Hill, n.d., 230 pages) and William Henry Smith, Graphic Statistics in 
Management (McGraw-Hill, n.d., 360 pages). In the 1930s, the only British authored 
works appears to have that by Rose, Business Charts (94 pages), published in 1930 by 
Pitmans. While the number of books published in Britain on the topic of the use of graphs 
in business was small before 1940, this was not markedly out of line with the situation 
found in America at this time.
4  
                                                 
4 Using information from Yates (1989) and the Library of Congress catalogue, nine works can be identified 
in the USA. Carl Parsons advocated the use of diagrams for managers in his work Business Administration, 
published in 1909, but it was not until a few years later that books devoted to the topic appeared: Willard C. 
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In what follows we do not intend to provide an overview of the development of 
management ideas in the literature, but rather to focus on a small number of works which 
dealt especially with the use of statistics and graphs for the purpose of managerial 
control. In particular we focus on the work of two individuals: Edward Tregaskiss 
Elbourne (1875-1935) and Thomas Gerald Rose (1886-1963). 
 
3.1.1  The work of E.T. Elbourne 
 
One of the first works in Britain to advocate the widespread use of statistics and graphs in 
Britain was Elbourne‟s Factory Administration and Accounts, first published in 1914. 
Elbourne, formerly works accountant to Messrs. Vickers, Sons & Maxim Ltd., and 
departmental works manager to the Birmingham Small Arms Co. Ltd. (BSA), wrote his 
work while working for John I. Thorneycroft and Co. Ltd. (Brech 1997, 12). In 1915 
Elbourne was appointed as assistant works manager of the Ponders End Shell factory and 
through his work there, and the people with which he came into contact, especially the 
accountant John Mann, Elbourne‟s ideas on administration became more widely 
recognised. His book was “recommended as a guidance-manual to managers and 
directors in other war-production factories and companies” (Brech 1997, 12), which led 
to several re-printings of the work during the period 1916 to 1918. During the latter year, 
at the end of a series of articles on „labour administration‟ in The Engineer, Elbourne 
announced his intention to form “a society or institution for pursuing research in 
„industrial administration‟” (Brech 1997, 11-13). In 1919, together with his business 
partner, Henry Brindley, formerly his boss at the Ponders End Shell factory, Elbourne 
launched the Institute of Industrial Administration (IIA), one of a number of 
organisations which was formed during the post-First World War period to try to bring 
together those involved in various aspects of management.  
Under Elbourne‟s guidance, the IIA focused in particular on the provision of 
education for managers, drawing up an extensive syllabus of studies during 1921-22 for 
launch in the IIA‟s journal in December 1922 and March 1923 (Brech 1997, 27). Shortly 
after this, however, the IIA became somewhat moribund for several years, though its 
                                                                                                                                                 
Business Man (c.1917). About the same time, two works combined cost accounting, statistics and graphs: 
[no author] Costs and Statistics; Basic Cost Principles, Mapping Out the Cost System, Graphs and 
Statistics, Expense Control (Chicago & New York: A.W. Shaw Co., c.1914 – 200pp.), and G. De Witt 
Bender, Accounting and Business Secrets; A Ready Reference Book of Accounting Principles, Forms, 
Charts, Rules, Tables…(Seattle: Metropolitan Press, c.1920 – 64pp.). Further works appeared in the 1920s: 
Bertie C. Forbes, Business Analysis with Charts; or Charting as a Pathway to Success (Chicago: Business 
Charting Institute, c.1921 – 35pp.) and, more significantly, Allan C. Haskell, Graphic Charts for the 
Business Man (Codex Book Co. of New York, 1922). The latter work appeared in three editions during the 
1920s, increasing in size from 250 pages in the first edition of 1922 through to 451 pages in the third 
edition of 1928. Only three other works devoted to graphs appeared in the interwar years: Winfield A. 
Savage, Graphic Analysis for Executives (New York: Codex Book Co., 1926 – 164pp); A.L. DeLeeuw, 
How’s Business? Industrial Control by Graphics (New York: Codex Book Co., 1928 – 205pp) and Willard 
C. Brinton, Graphic Presentation (Brinton Associates, 1939 - apparently a revised version of his earlier, 
1914, work). In France, Satet published the first edition of Les graphiques, moyen de direction des 
entreprises, a short work of 64 pages in 1931 which subsequently appeared in at least 12 editions over the 
next forty years. The 5
th edition of 1944, co-authored with Charles Voraz, represented a completely re-
written work, extending to 293 pages, while the 12
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syllabus was followed in a number of venues, most notably the Regent‟s Street 
Polytechnic in London. Despite the problems which becalmed the IIA in the mid-1920s, 
Elbourne‟s work clearly continued to have an impact. In 1919 and 1921 „new‟ editions of 
his text appeared, the 1921 version be re-titled Factory Administration and Cost 
Accounts. The 1921 edition was reprinted in 1929 and a „students‟ edition was published 
in 1931. Three years later, in 1934, Elbourne (assisted by K.B. Elbourne and P.J. Amer) 
had published a new work entitled Fundamentals of Industrial Administration, which 
appeared in four editions between 1934 and 1947, the fourth edition (edited by H. 
McFarland Davis) being reprinted five times between 1953 and 1967. But what was 
Elbourne‟s view of the use of statistics and charts, and how did this change over time?  
A key objective of Elbourne‟s 1914 book was to emphasise his view that 
accounting, be it in relation to works accounts or financial accounts, and works 
management were part and parcel of the same phenomenon – they should not be 
considered separately as he suggested had been the case in the past. Elbourne pointed to 
the fact that works (i.e. cost) account figures could be used for administrative purposes, 
but in order to “avoid confusion with the accounts as such” he considered it “convenient 
to speak of the data derived from the accounts for administrative purposes as 
administrative statistics” (1916, 381). He also pointed out that “The principle on which a 
works accounting system is constructed should be such as to provide with the minimum 
of analysis or reconstruction, the essential statistics necessary for exercising continuously 
efficient control” (Elbourne 1916, 381). While stressing the benefits of statistics to the 
general manager and, especially, the works manager of a company, Elbourne also urged 
caution in their use (1916, 382): 
 
    It is generally recognised that the value of statistics lies in their availability 
for comparison, and that averaging is necessary to get their true import. 
    From this follows two main requirements in statistics, firstly, that the 
scope of the figures to be compared shall be identical, and secondly, that the basis 
upon which averages are calculated shall be such as will not misrepresent the 
facts underlying the original figures. 
 
In this last regard, it was vital that “The works manager should apply his practical 
experience of the conditions of the factory so as to ensure that the statistics reflect the real 
facts of the case” (Elbourne 1916, 381).  
Elbourne also noted the usefulness of graphs and charts for presentational 
purposes, referring to their use for examining issues such as the “relative burden of works 
expenses that is carried by each department”, and noted that “graphical charts of the shop 
charge totals for each amount (sic.) period will indicate whether the normal departmental 
expenses are being met” (both quotes, Elbourne 1916, 384). Elbourne also made 
reference to the mode of presenting the data, talking of charts that are “cumulative in 
form, so that the total of each period is added to the previous total, and the curve rises 
from zero at the beginning to the year‟s total at the end” (1916, 384). In relation to the 
curve to be used for plotting the departmental expenses apportioned and the shop charges 
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  Two diagonal lines can be also drawn, one to represent the reference total of 
departmental expenses assumed in working out the normal shop charge rates and 
one to represent the total departmental expenses of the previous year spread 
evenly over the fortnightly account periods. 
 
Elbourne went on to note that charts of this sort help to provide “a very real insight … as 
to the trend of the relative factory efficiency” (1916, 385). In the main the focus of the 
statistical information to be collected and presented in graphs was of a financial nature 
drawn from the accounts (both works and financial). Indeed, it was later claimed that: 
“The object of keeping statistical records within a business is, in the first instance, partly 
to supplement and partly to explain the financial accounts for the purpose of achieving 
better administration” (1947, 256). 
  While Elbourne noted the potential of charts for examining trends in factory 
efficiency, the emphasis in early editions of his work was on the use of charts for 
comparing the present with the past, i.e. looking backwards. While efficiency was a 
concern for Elbourne, there was no direct reference, as such, to issues of managerial 
control, either in the text or in the index to his work. Indeed, the latter refers to just two 
issues of control: control of staff and stock control. Scientific management did warrant an 
entry in the index, but the issue of forecasting did not. 
 
3.1.2  T.G. Rose
5 
 
Within the space of five years in the middle of the interwar period, Rose authored two 
works, both published by Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd.: Business Charts in 1930 and 
Higher Control. A Manual for Company Directors, Secretaries and Accountants, etc. in 
1934. The former was one of a small number of books on the topic of the use of charts in 
business published during the interwar period
6, while the latter, which built on the ideas 
of the former, was the sole work to discuss the concept of Higher Control. The aim of 
Higher Control was to “portray a method of executive control by means of which danger 
points in management are automatically brought to attention” (Anderson 1935, 111). A 
centre-piece of this concept was the advocacy of graphs and moving annual totals 
(MATs) to determine the trend of progress in a business. The inspiration for the use of 
MATs in Higher Control had been Rose‟s discovery of the Z-chart, a series of three lines 
plotted on the same graph forming a chart that looked like a figure „Z‟. The lower of the 
two horizontal components comprised a plot of the total for each period during the 
current year, while the higher one represented the MAT for the same variable. The 
diagonal component of the letter „Z‟ was created by the cumulation over the year of the 
individual period figures. As Rose (1968, 17) pointed out, he had first discovered this 
concept on reading Karsten‟s Charts and Graphs c.1928 while researching his own work, 
Business Charts. Rose, however, did not specifically advocate the use of the Z-chart, 
placing the emphasis on plotting the MAT and the current periodic data on the same 
                                                 
5 A fuller biography of Rose can be found in the appendix to this paper. 
6 The book “was the outcome of a series of nine articles on Business Statistics which were published 
between 27
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graph, reminiscent of Elbourne‟s concern with presenting more than a single set of data 
on each graph. 
Rose‟s approach, therefore, favoured the use of what later became known as the 
„curmat‟ chart, i.e. the „Z‟-chart without the cumulative diagonal line (see Rose and Farr 
1957, 13, 54). This approach was justified by the fact that the removal of the cumulative 
line enabled the chart to be made smaller, while it was pointed out that it was the MAT 
that tended to be used as the basis for planning, not the current or cumulative lines. 
 
 
3.2  Developments in Practice 
 
3.2.1  Pre-1920 
 
As in the USA, the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the growing use in 
certain businesses in key sectors of British industry, such as the coal industry, iron and 
steel, etc., of written reports provided by executive officers to owners and non-executive 
directors of registered companies. Colliery managers, especially in the larger concerns, as 
the key executives in the coal industry, were required to submit regular reports on the 
progress of the collieries under their control to the boards of directors of the companies 
which controlled them. These reports often included statistical data on production, days 
worked, number of idle days, etc., as well as cost per ton figures, not just for the current 
period but also for the previous period (Boyns 1993; Boyns and Wale 1996, 68-76). In 
the iron and steel industry, similar returns were required from the managers of different 
works departments by the general manager, who then reported key information up to the 
board. The reports from the various managerial levels would, as in the coal industry, 
often include large amounts of statistical data, of both physical quantities (e.g. output 
tonnage, yields, etc.) and of a financial nature (Boyns and Edwards 1997). Graphs 
presenting such information can also be found in the archives of some companies, 
especially in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, but whether their use was a 
regular occurrence or not is uncertain, it not being clear if the small number of such 
graphs is due to the intermittent nature of their production or the limited survival of what 
were regularly produced documents. 
  One company about which detailed information exists is Hans Renold Ltd., an 
engineering firm based in Manchester. The company had long reported financial and 
other statistics to board meetings, thus we find, at the company‟s Head Office meeting on 
9 April 1915, reference to the presentation each month of: a Bank forecast, indicating 
Customers' overdue accounts and position of doubtful debts; a monthly trading account 
and balance sheet; sales & orders; and 'Cost Charts' (MCL, M501 650.0522 HR 910/6). 
During the remainder of the war years numerous changes were made to the firm‟s 
organisational structure and the data collected and presented to board meetings. At the 
Head Office meeting held on 19 March 1918 it was noted that together with the balance 
sheet for February and Trading Account for January, they had discussed the budget for 
March to August inclusive and the „Business Barometer‟ (MCL, M501 650.0522 HR 
910/10). The nature of this „Business Barometer‟, which was to be presented on a weekly 
basis (as with the budget statement), contained a mixture of financial and non-financial 
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total) and „commitments‟, and figures for „incomings‟, i.e. actual figures for „chains and 
accessories‟, „wheels‟, „fuses and parts‟, „shells‟ and „turnbuckles‟ and „commitments‟, 
i.e. orders received for various products. The „difference in + out -‟ was also recorded, as 
were statistics on the number of employees, broken down into those paid hourly, weekly 
and monthly, and for overtime, both in terms of the hours worked and cost. The final 




3.2.2  c.1920-c.1940 
 
The increased advocacy of the use of statistics and graphs in books relating to business 
was paralleled by their apparent growing use within British businesses, though the rate of 
progress is not, as yet, well understood. One source of information on this issue is the 
archives of the Management Research Groups (MRGs). The MRGs came into being in 
late 1926/early 1927
7 as a mechanism for the interchange of management ideas and 
practices amongst non-competing firms, i.e. each group never contained more than one 
firm from any industrial sector, in order to foster a willingness to exchange views and 
practices and discuss ideas, something which it was felt would be less likely to occur 
between firms competing in the same sector. The initial focus was on a small number of 
groups, of which MRG No. 1, representing large industrial undertakings was probably the 
most significant, but the number of groups expanded rapidly to nine by 1930 (BLPES 
Ward W/3/30/7, List of members).
8 
  The annual reports and other surviving documents of the MRGs reveal concerns 
amongst members in the late 1920s and during the 1930s with issues such as the use of 
statistics and graphs, managerial control, and the fundamentals of organisation and 
administration. These concerns are reflected in the discussions held within the various 
groups at different times. Thus, during 1929, MRG No. 6 discussed „graphical control‟ 
(BLPES Ward W/3/29/7) while the 1930 annual report notes the publication of a report 
on „Control Chart for Chief Executive‟ (BLPES W/3/30/7, ff.4-5), while at their meeting 
on 18 July 1934, the members of MRG No. 1 considered methods of visual presentation 
of statistical and other facts for the use of executives. Amongst those companies which 
provided information as to their use of charts and/or examples of the charts that they used 
for the purpose of fostering discussion were Rowntree & Co. Ltd., the Associated 
Equipment Co. Ltd. (AEC), and the Austin Motor Co. Ltd. (BLPES Ward W/11/34/19). 
While AEC merely stated that they “make use of charts for various purposes” (BLPES 
Ward W/11/34/19, f.1), Austin Motors, which operated a sophisticated system of 
                                                 
7 The first annual report of the MRGs covered the period to 31 December 1927. In this it was noted that the 
decision to establish such groups had been taken on 1 June 1926, when it was determined to form “an 
Industrial Group consisting of large-sized firms” (BLPES Ward Papers W/3/27/7, f.1). The first official 
meeting of this group took place on 2 February 1927, having been upstaged by meetings of Industrial 
Groups 2 and 3. Group 2 comprised firms employing between 500 and 2,000 employees, and met officially 
for the first time on 21 January 1927, just over a week after Group 3, a group containing firms employing 
up to 500 persons, which had met officially for the first time on 13 January 1927. At a meeting held on 23 
June 1927 the name of the movement was changed from „Industrial Groups‟ to „Management Research 
Groups‟ (BLPES Ward Papers W/3/27/7, f.1). 
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budgetary control (see Perry-Keene 1922-23), indicated that though they utilised “three 
main notations” for checking progress, they made “comparatively little use of purely 
graphic method in fact presentation, as we find that data presented in regular form 
conveys adequately the impression intended” (BLPES Ward W/11/34/19, ff.1-2). 
Rowntree & Co, indicated that they “did not use graphic methods extensively, and where 
we do use them they are mostly the well-known and simple types” (BLPES Ward 
W/11/34/19 - memo from Rowntree & Co., dated 2/7/34). However, although it was also 
stated that Rowntree‟s had “not got a complete range of charts covering various 
functional activities and leading up to a Chief Executive‟s control”, as would have been 
the case if they had adopted Rose‟s concept of Higher Control, they noted the use of 
“plain arithmetic line charts, bar charts, and „Z‟ charts‟, but not „ratio charts, Gantt charts, 
calculating charts, or circle charts, except possibly in odd and isolated cases” (BLPES 
Ward W/11/34/19 - memo from Rowntree & Co., dated 2/7/34). It was also recorded that 
“For the purpose of studying trends we also use weekly moving annual total charts for 
groups of products…” (BLPES Ward W/11/34/19 - memo from Rowntree & Co., dated 
2/7/34) 
Thus, even amongst companies which are known to have been amongst the most 
progressive of British large businesses, the use of charts for managerial control purposes 
does not seem to have been extensive in the mid-1930s. Indeed, BSA, which had always 
included a large range of data in the „Statistical folder‟ of reports received by each 
director prior to the monthly board meeting during the interwar years, only introduced 
graphs into the folder in April 1936.
9 In response to this development, one of the 
directors, A.J.H. Pollen
10, in a letter to A.E. Berriman, assistant managing director of 
BSA, dated 6 April 1936, while approving of the development of the use of graphs, 
nevertheless suggested that perhaps they should be made in the form of a Z-chart. Of this 
type of chart Pollen commented that it is “quite simple and far more intelligible than 
merely scale graphs, the real significance of which it is very difficult to grasp, especially 
when not made on squared paper” (CRO, PA594/2/1/2/22).  
Moving away from the issue of graphs, we find somewhat more broad ranging 
discussions within the MRGs, such as that on the „Records necessary to control of a 
Business‟ discussed by MRG No. 5 in 1928 (BLPES Ward W/3/28/7, f.9), and as 
reflected in two reports published in 1931 on „Costs and their Relation to Control‟ 
(prepared by the costing sub-group of MRG No. 6) and „The Scope of Scientific Office 
Management‟, a reprint of a paper given by W.H. Leffingwell to the American National 
Association of Office Managers (BLPES Ward W/3/31/7, f.6). Other discussions 
conducted by the MRGs were more specific, including a growing concern with the issue 
of „budgetary control‟. This topic first featured in a meeting of MRG No. 3A in 1928 
(BLPES Ward W/3/28/7, f.8) while during 1929 MRG No. 6 discussed the matter 
(BLPES Ward W/3/29/7). The first two meetings of MRG No. 7 in 1931 were devoted to 
                                                 
9 All of the charts were of monetary values and related to either sales (individual charts were presented for 
cars, motor cycles and pedal cycles) or orders received (separate charts for guns and „Sparkbrook‟, one of 
the company‟s works). Monthly data was plotted on a cumulative basis for the period of the current 
financial year to the end of February 1936 (a red line) and, for comparison, also shown (as black lines) 
were the annual cumulative figures for 1933/34 and 1934/35 (except for the BSA Group Net Sales chart 
which only had comparative data for 1934/35) (CRO PA594/1/1/3/160). 
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the topic of budgeting, in particular sales and sales expense budgets (BLPES Ward 
W/3/31/7, f.19). In 1933 budgetary control was very much to the fore: “In March the 
system of Budgetary Control which has been of enormous assistance to Karrier Motors 
Ltd. in facing the difficult conditions of the last few years was described in detail” at a 
meeting of MRG No. 3 (BLPES Ward W/3/33/7, f.10).
11 At a later meeting of the group, 
when budgetary control was further discussed, one member “described how he had 
applied part of the Budgetary Control technique of Karrier Motors Ltd. with immediately 
satisfactory results” (BLPES Ward W/3/33/7, f.11). In late 1933, MRG No. 1 set up a 
committee to examine the utilisation of budgetary control within the member firms and a 
full report was produced later the following year (for fuller details see Boyns 1998). In 
1935, at the last yearly meeting of MRG No. 2, which was “restricted to Directors and 
other officers with equivalent responsibility” (BLPES Ward W/3/35/7, f.13), a discussion 
on „Profit Control‟ was opened by F.L. Impey (of Morland & Impey Ltd.). It was 
recorded that a “large part of the subsequent general discussion was on aspects of 
Budgetary Control” (BLPES Ward W/3/35/7, f.13). 
Paralleling this increasing concern with the issue of budgetary control, the MRG 
archives also reveal a concern with other aspects of control. Thus, in 1929, a „Higher 
Administration and Control‟ sub-committee of MRG No. 1 was formed. The discussions 
of the meetings of this sub-committee, which met for the first time on 29 October 1929, 
together with the various memoranda supplied by members, are instructive as to practices 
of the time (BLPES Ward W/11/29/19?). The aims of the committee were declared to be 
“the joint study, from experience, of the essential principles underlying the effective 
control, financial and administrative, of a large business” (BLPES Ward W/11/29/19?, 
f.1). C.W. Reeve, managing director of AEC “suggested that the Sub-Committee should 
set itself to decide what a Managing Director wants, and when he wants it; i.e. what 
figures, whether these figures should be estimated or actual, and whether they should 
work by calendar months or on 13 4-weekly periods” (BLPES Ward W/11/29/19?, f.3). 
B.S. Rowntree concurred with this view, stating that he “thought it would be a good idea 
if some one could draw up a statement summarising the facts necessary for running a 
business” (BLPES Ward W/11/29/19?, f.4). One upshot of the sub-committee‟s first 
meeting was that all members of MRG No. 1 were invited to submit a statement 
“summarising the natures of their business and the kinds of accounts or statistical returns 
found necessary for effective control, especially in relation to the four main functions of 
Purchasing, Production, Finance and Sales” (BLPES Ward W/11/29/19?, f.4). 
Memoranda were received from the English Electric Company (electrical goods), 
Rowntree & Co. Ltd. (chocolate), Pilkington Brothers Ltd. (glass), the Dunlop Rubber 
Co. Ltd. (tyres), and the Gramophone Co. Ltd., while comments were also made at the 
first meeting by representatives of Lever Brothers Ltd. (soap and chemicals), Wolsey Ltd. 
(wool textiles) and AEC (motor coaches) (BLPES Ward W/11/29/19?, f.1). They indicate 
the use of a mix of both statistical returns relating to quantities of goods produced or sold, 
as well as financial returns in relation thereto and relating to costs and profits. At English 
Electric, for example, it was noted that under manufacturing, it was essential to know  
(BLPES Ward W/11/29/19?, English Electric memo): 
 
                                                 
11 The fluidity of membership of the MRGs is reflected in the fact that, by 31 December 1933, Karrier 
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a.  that the number of orders to the factory is being maintained at the proper rate, 
b.  that the output from the factory is following a pre-determined programme. 
c.  that the cost of production is competitive, and is near the estimated figure on 
which selling prices are based. 
d.  that the on-cost charges in the factory are not increasing and are being 
absorbed. 
e.  that the value of defective products, due either to unsuitable material or 
manufacturing errors, is reasonable. 
 
Under sales of final products the requirements were to know: 
 
a.  the competitive market prices, 
b.  that the rate of sales is being maintained at the proper figure. 
 
At the Dunlop Robber Co., which had factories in various parts of Britain and 
plantations and cotton mills overseas, it was noted that all main statistics, both financial 
and those relating to quantities of product made and sold, “are centralised in the Chief 
Accountants Office in London and submitted direct to the Managing Director” (BLPES 
Ward W/11/29/19?, Dunlop memo, f.4). Different types of report were clearly presented 
at different frequencies at the Gramophone Co. Ltd.: net sales, shipments of machines, 
returns of staff and wages, and a Head office financial statement were reported weekly, 
with other figures being returned monthly or half-yearly as considered appropriate. It is 
clear that not just the current period‟s figures were returned, but also those for cumulated 
periods and comparative figures for the same periods for previous years. 
In the discussion which took place at the first meeting of the sub-committee on 29 
October 1929, it was found that the frequency with which returns were submitted to the 
managing director varied from monthly to half-yearly depending on the nature of the 
return, while in “most cases returns having a fundamental bearing on policy were 
submitted quarterly” (BLPES Ward W/11/29/19?, f.2). The subsequent survey of 
members, however, indicated that managing directors preferred to have data on a four 
weekly basis. In the view of C.W. Barnish, managing director of Lever Brothers Ltd., it 
was only necessary to control profit and capital expenditure, most other controls being 
“subservient to these two” (BLPES Ward W/11/29/19?, f.2). Production returns, Barnish 
noted, “were drawn up monthly in each department to see if a profit or loss was being 
made, losses being immediately investigated” (BLPES Ward W/11/29/19?, f.2). V. 
Watlington, managing director of English Electric, indicated that he “considered statistics 
less value as absolute measurements than as standards of comparison and indicators of 
trends” (BLPES Ward W/11/29/19?, f.3). He also indicated that English Electric “set a 
„Bogey‟ figure for each department, and a failure to reach the “Bogey” was reported to 
the Managing Director and investigated” (BLPES Ward W/11/29/19?, f.3). Alfred Salt, a 
director of Wolsey Ltd., noted that his company used standard costs, while Lord Cozens-
Hardy, managing director of Pilkington Brothers, referred to the benefits his company 
had secured in “the classification of orders and accountancy problems generally … by the 
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Although the Higher Administration and Control sub-committee of MRG No. 1 
was only in existence for a short period of time in late 1929 and possibly early 1930
12, 
during 1930, the members of MRG No. 3A decided to undertake visits to each other to 
examine the issue of „Higher Control‟. It was explained that, “At each visit the host 
Company indicates the essential factors upon which the success of the business depends. 
The Group then examines the method by which these factors are controlled” (BLPES 
Ward W/3/30/7, f.15). It is clear therefore, that at the end of the 1920s and during the 
early 1930s, despite the existence of competing ideas such as budgetary control, higher 
control was an issue that was on the agenda of the top management personnel in a 
number of British firms. The appearance of Rose‟s book, entitled Higher Control, in 
1934, therefore appears to reflect a concern which had a contemporary element to it. But 
what, precisely, was Higher Control, and from where did the idea emanate? 
 
 
4.  HIGHER CONTROL 
 
4.1.  Higher Control 
 
4.1.1  Origins 
 
Higher Control was clearly a development of the systematic management movement in 
Britain during the early twentieth century, and especially the interwar period, as 
exemplified in Britain by the development of the IIA and the MRGs. Although not 
involved with either organisation from the outset, Rose became an important player in the 
IIA during the 1930s (being vice-chairman from 1932-37 and chairman 1938-43) and, 
through his links with Arthur Joseph Hungerford Pollen and Linotype & Machinery Ltd., 
with the MRGs for a short, but important time, in the early 1930s.
13 While it was Rose 
who publicised the concept of Higher Control through his book, first published in 1934, 
the concept was originally conceived and developed by Pollen, the chairman and 
managing director of Linotype & Machinery Ltd. (L&M), a medium-sized manufacturing 
company operating a works employing 2,000 workers, for his own personal use between 
1927 and 1930 (Rose 1968, xv).
14 Rose acknowledged his debt to Pollen in the opening 
sentence to the preface to the first edition of Higher Control: “The bold idea that it should 
be possible to build up an interlocked system of returns by means of which the activities 
of an industrial undertaking could be efficiently controlled must be ascribed to Mr. A.H. 
Pollen” (Rose 1934, xi). Shortly after taking up the post of chairman and managing 
                                                 
12 This was a fairly normal procedure – sub-committees were formed to examine a specific issue and once 
that task had been completed they were wound up and a different sub-committee would be formed to 
examine another topic as and when considered desirable. 
13 L&M was a member of MRG No. 6 as at 31 December 1930 and 1931 (and may have been a member in 
1929, but the membership list for this year has not survived). It was not listed as being a member as at 31 
December 1932, suggesting that the company may have relinquished its membership following Pollen‟s 
departure to BSA during the year. 
14 Rose (1968, 3) notes that, with the assistance of Tom Drake, the works manager, and Cyril Summers, the 
chief accountant, from 1926 Pollen gradually „created a network of facts and figures which functioned so 
smoothly and effectively that it enabled him to keep a close control from London over what went on at the 








































0  15 
director of L&M in 1926, a post which he held until July 1932
15, Pollen called in Rose, 
who had just commenced a career as a free-lance consultant, to help him reorganise 
aspects of the business. The two appear to have worked together throughout Pollen‟s 
tenure of office at L&M, developing and refining their ideas, and had a great mutual 
respect for each other. It is not clear precisely when the concept of Higher Control was 
born, though it seems to have been given an early, possibly its first, public airing on 19 
May 1931 when Rose presented a paper on the topic to the IIA (Rose 1954, 66). 
  Later in 1931 Pollen suggested the adoption of such ideas at BSA, where he was a 
director. BSA was an engineering conglomerate which found itself in deep financial 
trouble at the beginning of the 1930s, due to poor strategic decisions taken in the 1920s 
and the impact of the world slump, and was in urgent negotiations with its bankers 
regarding a financial package to stave off bankruptcy. Seven months before he resigned 
the L&M post to take over, albeit briefly, as chairman of BSA, Pollen suggested, in a 
letter to Percy Martin, BSA‟s managing director, dated 29 December 1931, that he might 
like to avail himself of Rose‟s services. He noted in this letter that Rose (CRO, 
PA594/2/1/2/23): 
 
  was very useful to me when I took over L.&M., and … is a noted master of 
relevant return figures, graphs, etc. It seems to me that this is just the kind of man 
that the bank would want, in preference to an accountant, and I think his 
references – Beardmore‟s, the Securities Management Trust, etc., would be just 
what the bank would find impressive. 
 
Knowledge of Higher Control was more widely disseminated in 1932 when an 
accountant employed by L&M, Mr. B. Biddle, ACA, read “an extremely practical paper 
on Higher Control” before MRG No. 6 (BLPES Ward W/3/32/7, f.16). Two years later, 
in 1934, the idea was made publicly available through the publication of a full account of 
the concept in Rose‟s book. 
 
 
4.1.2  The concept of Higher Control 
 
The precise contents of the 1931 and 1932 papers on Higher Control delivered by Rose 
and Biddle respectively are, unfortunately, not known. However, an early spelling out of 
the basic approach is to be found in a letter from Pollen to BSA‟s chairman, Percy 
Martin, dated 30 December 1931. In this letter, the importance of financial accounting 
data was clearly outlined (CRO, PA594/2/1/2/23): 
 
  The fundamental idea is to segregate the factors that determine the profit making 
capacity of the undertaking, the turn-over or sales at the head of the column, and 
                                                 
15 Linotype & Machinery was the British arm of an effective three member Linotype monopoly comprising 
the American firm, Mergenthaler Linotype Co. of New York, and a German firm. It had been founded in 
1898 by Joseph Lawrence, Pollen‟s father-in-law, and Pollen had been the company‟s first managing 
director between 1898 and 1904. He continued to be a non-executive director after 1904 until returning as 
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then the several deductions that must be made before arriving at the trading 
profit…. 
    It is found to be a comparatively simple thing for all these factors to be 
returned at required intervals – say monthly – and a balance sheet got out showing 
exactly where the different factors are coming up to or falling behind expectation. 
This gives an immediate running check on your factory, your selling organisation, 
and your company organisation, which shows at once whether your plans are 
being realised, and the exact place where examination is necessary either to 
correct the plan or to enforce it. 
 
  The record of Biddle‟s presentation to MRG No. 6 in April 1932 reveals that the 
various reports produced as part of Higher Control not only described the position at the 
works but, in particular, laid bare the business, trading and financial positions of L&M 
(BLPES Ward W/3/32/7, f.16). Although it had grown out of a system of works control, 
and represented an attempt to extend the principle of this control to the company as 
whole (Rose 1947, 94), the original version of Higher Control nevertheless relegated 
works control to a minor role, focusing instead of these three key „positions‟. Thus, Rose 
defined Higher Control in the first edition of his work as (1934, 67): 
 
  a monthly survey of the functional activities of a commercial undertaking, carried 
out from the business, trading, and financial viewpoints, and based upon direct 
trend comparison between the position at the moment and the position at the last 
financial year. 
 
When the fourth edition of Rose‟s work was first published in 1944, a fourth 
„position‟, the „technical position‟, was added, representing a restoration of works control 
to a more significant position in the whole scheme of things. The rationale for this was 
explained thus (Rose 1947, 92): 
 
  As the method was gradually adopted by firms in industry, it became clear that 
the technical aspect of affairs also needed watching. This was foreshadowed in a 
paper read by the author before the Institute of Industrial Administration in 1932 
entitled “The Management Audit”…. At that time it was not sufficiently realized 
that the whole field of technical activities, covering the manufacturing processes, 
the problems arising from plant, machinery and layout, the experimental and 
development work, and other works naturally had, directly or indirectly, 
considerable influence upon the business, trading, and financial figures of the 
company. They needed therefore just as much watching by the chief to ensure that 
the duties were being properly handled, and were not being neglected or badly 
managed. 
 
The concept of the „technical position‟ comprised, in the main, much of what had 
originally been discussed in the first edition of Higher Control under the title of „works 
control‟ (Rose 1947, ix-x). In that first edition, „works control‟ had formed the substance 
of the penultimate chapter (ch. XII) and it was indicated there that it was based on “works 
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financial accounts” (Rose 1934, 225). The key function of works control was seen as 
being the attainment of “an accurate picture of the balance between production and sales” 
(Rose 1934, 226). The six key indicators which made this possible were: orders received 
at works; order book at works; stocks (of finished goods); total employees; nightshift and 
overtime; and works output. It was also recognised that there was an additional range of 
figures which would be “of considerable value in increasing the efficiency standards of 
the place” (Rose 1934, 226). The elevation of the status of „works control‟ through the 
instigation of the „technical position‟ in the fourth edition was reflected in the fact that 
the material was now included in chapter VII, coming immediately after the chapter on 
the business position and immediately before those on the trading and financial positions. 
However, it should be noted that the report on the „technical position‟ would need to 
include elements not formerly recognised under works control, in particular, reports from 
the chief engineer and the personnel/labour manager. Despite the fact that Rose 
considered that many aspects of the work of these two individuals “does not readily lend 
itself to statistical record” (1947, 94), certain monthly statistics relating to the work of 
these person‟s departments were seen as being of interest to the chief executive, for 
example, the number of different types of people employed in the business and in each 
department, and the number of new production drawings, traces, etc. issued (Rose 1947, 
116-117). 
  The placing of the chapter on the technical position between that on the business 
position and those on the trading and financial positions reflected the fact that the data 
relating to it could be available very shortly after the end of the relevant trading period, 
and could thus be presented alongside those for the business position in the Part I report 
received by the chief executive; reporting could occur more quickly than for the trading 
and financial reports which comprised Part II of the regular reporting cycle. The Part I 
reports should ideally be with the managing director within three days of the end of the 
month and those forming Part II should be with him within three weeks of the month-end 
(Rose and Farr 1957: pp.10-15). Rose recognised that while the other three control 
aspects “deal more with the statistical side of the business”, the “Technical Position is the 
section in which most of the general comments on the day-to-day happenings in the 
works will arise, although many of them may not be of a technical nature” (1947, 117-
118). In the seventh and final edition of Higher Control, Rose noted that technical 
position represented a control aspect which was “far more specialized and individual than 
the other three, as its structure naturally depends upon the nature of the business” (1968, 
67). Rose also noted that the „technical position‟ represented the place where “the data 
relating to all the miscellaneous activities which are not directly part of the Business, 




4.1.3. The applicability of Higher Control 
 
It is clear that the method of Higher Control was considered to be applicable to all firms, 
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president of H.B. Maynard and Co. Inc.
16, pointed out that, although the technique had 
been worked out initially in a medium-sized manufacturing company: 
 
The system of higher management controls described in the pages that follow not 
only gives the chief executive of the small, medium-sized or large business the 
information he needs to direct his business properly, but it presents it in such an 
easy-to-interpret form that he will find it requires much less time to absorb than 
the less complete and less well-coordinated data he has been using in the past. 
 (Rose and Farr 1957, vii) 
 
It was pointed out, however, that the technique had a special advantage for the small 
business, namely that it cost little to install, a view which had been recognised by the 
reviewers of the first edition of Higher Control. Anderson (1935, 111), for example, 
having praised the clarity of the presentation and the helpfulness of the charts contained 
in the work, went on to note the simplicity, “ease and small costs” associated with the 
method advocated. Furthermore, it was claimed (Rose and Farr 1957, p.18) that: 
 
  Once the simple structure has been set up, it need never be changed however 
much the business may develop. With that development, the owner/manager is 
gradually forced further and further away from the day-to-day details, but he will 
still remain just as much in contact with what is going on. 
 
  In terms of the overall claims made for the concept of Higher Control, Pollen 
suggested that it “goes far to making any business manageable … [and] makes the 
responsibilities of a director a burden that any man of intelligence and some practical 
experience can safely undertake” (Rose 1934, ix). While Pollen‟s opinion was clearly 
biased, the reviewers of the first edition of Higher Control were sympathetic to many of 
the claims made. Rose‟s “plea for the presentation of accountancy results from the point 
of view of assisting management” was noted by the unknown reviewer in The 
Accountant, who went on to add that “there is little doubt that the intelligent and 
immediate presentation of figures is the keynote of industrial management” (both quotes 
1934, 472). The British economist P. Sargent Florence‟s overall view of Rose‟s book was 
that “The widespread adoption of his system of control may well make the co-ordination 
within large-scale organisation more easy, and increase the actual size of the unit of 
control nearer to the optimum” (1935, 344). The American accountant Arthur G. 
Anderson referred to the book as „worthwhile‟, and noted the author‟s “enthusiasm and 
thoroughness” (1935 111). However, neither the American accountant W.P. Fiske, nor 
the unknown reviewer for The Accountant, considered that what Rose was telling his 
audience was anything new. Fiske concluded that “there is little really new in this book” 
(1936, 451-452), particularly from an American perspective.
17 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that Donald E. Farr, Rose‟s co-author, was vice-president of this company. 
17 In opening his review, Fiske had warned readers that, in order to appreciate the work, they should read 
the book in the knowledge that it was written from a British background – implying that British firms did 
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  One final aspect of Higher Control to which attention should perhaps be drawn is 
that both Pollen and Rose likened it to the audit function
18 in accounting (Rose 1934, ix-
x): 
 
  It discharges … for management, the task that auditors discharge for accounts and 
finance. Indeed it does more. The audit guarantees the shareholders that there has 
been no misrepresentation, no malversion of funds. Higher control is an assurance 
that the proofs of mismanagement are so unmistakably and swiftly disclosed that 
errors can be retrieved before their consequences become irreparable. 
 
 
5.  HIGHER CONTROL, BUDGETARY CONTROL AND THE TABLEAU DE 
BORD 
 
5.1  Higher Control and budgetary control 
 
The concepts of Higher Control and Budgetary Control both began to be discussed in 
earnest in Britain at or around the same time, i.e. the second half of the 1920s and during 
the 1930s. But to what extent do the links between these concepts go any deeper than 
this? Rose himself was clearly aware of the technique of budgetary control and spoke of 
the differences between the two concepts in the first edition of Higher Control. The most 
fundamental of these differences, in Rose‟s view, was that while budgetary control 
examined departures from a theoretical ideal, Higher Control recorded what was actually 
happening (1934, 75-76). Because of this, higher control avoided the “considerable 
amount of preliminary work in setting the ideal, or budget” (Rose 1934, 76). There was 
no need for the establishment of the complex structures required for setting a budget and, 
it was claimed that Higher Control “achieves a greater measure of guidance with an 
infinitely less amount of labour and expense” (Rose 1934, 76). Going further, Rose 
claimed (1934, 77): 
 
  ordinary accountancy methods provide little or nothing of what might be called 
real control, and budgetary control is not only a highly complicated affair, but 
also falls short in that it fails to provide that effective
19 comparison with the last 
financial year which is so essential. Higher control, with its balanced 
consideration of the business, trading, and financial activities all surveyed from 
the common comparative basis of last year‟s annual result, on the trend method, 
and arranged so that responsibility for success or failure can be assigned in the 
right direction, is the only effective system
20 by which an adequate review of the 
industrial position of a company can be attained. 
 
                                                 
18 The concept of the management audit was first aired in 1932 when Rose presented a paper on the topic to 
the IIA. This was published later the same year as The Management Audit, and was subsequently reprinted 
with minor additions and changes in 1944 and 1961. 
19 In the fourth edition (1944), the word „effective‟, used in the first three editions, was replaced by the 
word „continuous‟. 
20 In the fourth edition (1944), the phrase „which has yet been put forward‟ was added after the word 
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  It is clear from this quote that Rose saw accounting methods and budgetary 
control as being too narrow in their remit, focusing on financial measures alone for 
control purposes. Those charged with controlling a business, in Rose‟s view, required 
more than simply financial statistics. Rose (1934, 32) noted that, “In control work it is the 
practice to assess the figures obtained as primary, secondary, and subsidiary, according to 
their importance as a source of information to the managing director as to how the 
business is going on as a whole”. Primary figures showed only totals, whereas secondary 
figures showed the make-up of the primary figures, and subsidiary figures presented the 
minor subdivisions which went to make up the departmental totals (Rose 1934, 32). This 
categorization of data helped avoid too much time being spent by the managing director 
on unnecessary data.  
  In the first edition of Higher Control, Rose accepted that the idea of budgetary 
control was “fundamentally sound”, but noted that it “suffers from the drawback that 
obviously it is not always possible to reach the budgeted turnover, however carefully the 
budget estimate may be made” (1934, 74). More significantly for Rose, was the view that 
(1934, 75): 
 
budgetary control does not provide that balanced picture of affairs which the 
managing director has the right to demand. It will tell him whether his 
expenditure has been above or below his budget, whether his sales turnover is 
greater or less than he expected; but it fails in that it does not show him whether 
his concern is doing better or worse compared with the results of the last financial 
year. 
 
Twenty years later, in the US-version of his work, Rose and his American co-author, 
D.E. Farr, emphasised that, in contrast to budgetary control, there was no need with 
Higher Control to engage in detailed investigations of every variation in outcomes: 
 
  Much has been written on the making of budgets, but from a practical standpoint 
the only background is a combination of past records adjusted for present 
conditions surveyed in the light of future requirements. The layout of the Higher 
Control profit and loss statement is a great help in this, in its distinction between 
primary, secondary, and subsidiary figures. If therefore a departmental manager 
keeps inside his primary target figure of expense, he should not be criticized if 
one or two of his secondary figures are above budget. This gives him freedom of 
action and entirely avoids the time-wasting and irritating questioning into minor 
excesses long after they have occurred. In the rush and pressure of working 
activity, emergencies are continually arising, and excess of expenditure over 
budget figures is occasionally quite unavoidable. The responsible head of the 
department must be allowed to use his discretion on individual items, and only 
have to give explanations when his primary figure of expense for the period had 
been exceeded. 
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  Despite the relative success, in terms of its adoption, of budgetary control by 
firms in many countries by the mid-to-late 1950s, Rose continued to argue that Higher 
Control was superior to budgetary control: 
 
  [The] Management literature is full of references to budgetary control, standard 
cost control, quality control, production control, and the like. All these systems 
are valuable and have a part to play in raising the efficiency of management. But 
Higher Control is the only completely coordinated method of top-management 
control in which every aspect of a company‟s activities is watched over month by 
month. And the chief executive can rely on Higher Control to highlight any 
unfavourable movement of his affairs. 
(Rose and Farr 1957, 11) 
 
  Whereas the British reviewers did not mention the issue, the two American 
reviewers paid special attention to Rose‟s remarks on the differences between his 
technique and that of budgeting or budgetary control. Fiske remarked that the five steps 
laid out by Rose for installing Higher Control showed a “striking similarity to the steps 
involved in the installation of a budget” (1936, 451). Fiske, however, pointed out that 
Rose focused purely on the use of MATs for the purpose of control, making no reference 
to planning, something which was a common feature of budgeting in the USA. Anderson 
likewise picked up on Rose‟s negative view of “the effectiveness of budgeting because it 
does not directly show whether a firm is doing better or worse than the last financial 
year” (1935, 111), going on to suggest that “The reader will form his own opinion as to 
the importance of this feature, in view of the fact that the flexible budget idea does show 
accomplishment as compared with that planned. Perhaps this is more important” (1935, 
111). 
  The American criticisms of Rose‟s dismissal of the use of budgets for control 
purposes, and Fiske‟s comment that the book had to be read from a British perspective, 
clearly suggests that both he and Anderson viewed British methods of managerial control 
somewhat negatively. The America reviewers clearly considered Higher Control to be a 
lesser animal, something which moved in the direction of budgetary control but fell 
somewhat short of the mark. A key element here was clearly the advocacy by Rose of the 
use of actual data from the past for control purposes rather than the programmed figures 
favoured in budgetary control. Despite such criticisms, Rose continued to advocate the 
use of his method rather than budgetary control, even going so far as to claim in the final 
edition of his work that, “as a framework for presenting the movement of affairs in a 
company the Budgetary Control method can now be said to be definitely obsolete” (1968, 
43). Judging by the fact that seven editions of the work were published between 1934 and 
1963, not to mention numerous reprints of specific editions, there would appear to have 
been a sizeable audience willing to listen to his ideas in Britain, even after his death.
21 It 
therefore seems somewhat paradoxical that, despite the sales success of his book, the 
term „Higher Control‟ does not appear to have become part of the general managerial 
                                                 
21 The fourth edition, which first appeared in 1944, was reprinted at least three times – in 1945, 1946 and 
1947 – while the seventh and last edition, which first appeared in the year of Rose‟s death, 1963, was 
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terminology in Britain in the immediate post-Second World War period in the way that, 
for example, the term budgetary control did.
22  
  The widespread dominance of American ideas in management in the decades 
immediately after the Second World War may help to explain this, and also why there 
only ever appeared a single edition of the American version of the text. While the 
publication in the USA of Rose and Farr (1957) suggests that there were some across the 
Atlantic who considered the technique might have some appeal, the apparent lack of any 
reprints or the appearance of a second edition of the book would suggest that the 
audience there was limited. 
 
 
5.2  Higher Control and the tableau de bord 
 
According to Lebas (1996, 89): 
 
The term Tableau de Bord literally means „dashboard‟ of a car or „instrument 
panel‟ of a machine or a vehicle. It represents the set of selected indicators that 
allow the manager or the engineer (or the pilot or the „driver‟ of the machine or 
business) to successfully „operate‟ the physical and human assets that are his or 
her responsibility, in order to fulfill (sic.) the mission of the responsibility centre 
on an ongoing basis. 
 
From the description of the concept shown above in section 4.1.2, it would appear 
that Higher Control was also seen in a similar vein, though the use of equivalent 
terminology is not evident until the mid-1950s. Thus, in the introductory chapter of the 
American edition of his work, the task of the person in charge of steering a business is 
likened by Rose to that of the “nautical navigator” (Rose and Farr 1957, 3), while H.B. 
Maynard, in his foreword to the work, preferred an aeronautical analogy, talking of the 
businessman “flying blind” without “a well-organized set of control information” (Rose 
and Farr 1957, vi). However, it was recognised that (Rose and Farr 1957, 3): 
 
  The business navigator has a problem that is considerably more difficult than that 
faced by the nautical navigator. He has a more complex mechanism to operate. 
The variables which affect it are more numerous and less predictable. The seas on 
which he sails are less exactly charted. Without adequate controls, therefore, he is 
quite likely to be at the mercy of forces which he can neither resist nor direct 
because he does not understand them. 
                                                 
22 In terms of published works in which the phrase appears, the British Library integrated catalogue reveals 
only one use other than that by Rose: a 32-page publication, in 1942, of The development of the higher 
control of the machinery of government by M.P.A. Hankey (Baron Hankey) – a paper initially given as his 
Haldane Memorial Lecture. A search of the Library of Congress catalogue for the term reveals only 
publications by Rose, either individually or his joint book with Farr. A similar search for the term „higher 
management‟ in the Library of Congress catalogue reveals just two items: a series of monographs published 
by the Manchester Municipal College of Technology Department of Industrial Administration from 1946 
onwards – No. 3 in this series was Rose‟s The Mensuration of Management (1946); and an entry for the 
British Institute of Management which appears to have held regular series of „Higher management 
lectures‟, the 24
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In the seventh British edition of Higher Control, in attempting to stress the benefits of the 
method to small firms, Rose (1968, 209) noted that  
 
The little ship can be dangerously battered by storms through which the big liner 
will ride without much more than an uneasy motion. Hence a method of this 
nature, which sets out the position simply and clearly, and costs practically 
nothing in the doing of it, offers a practical assistance to the smaller businesses 
which is, indeed, invaluable. 
 
  Like the tableau de bord, Higher Control emphasised the visual presentation of 
data on a limited range of key variables or primary figures. According to Lebas (1996, 
89) the variables reported should reflect the key parts of the organizational system of the 
business, including external elements such as competition, the evolution of demand and 
tastes, technological innovations, etc. While Rose continuously stressed the importance 
of primary figures and the need for these to be presented in chart form using the MAT 
method, the focus of Higher Control was squarely on the internal elements of the 
business rather than external ones since, according to Rose, “Over the outside problems 
he [the director] can exercise but little control, but what is going on inside the 
organization of his concern should be ascertainable” (1934, 4). 
An essential feature of the tableau de bord approach, as described by Lebas (1996, 
91-92), is that it “does not give a major place to accounting-based information (which 
tends to be mostly responsibility accounting-based). Physical information is considered to 
be anticipatory and a better base for decision making”. However, Lebas goes on to note 
that “synthetic accounting data” will often be included within the tableau de bord since 
all decisions have economic consequences. Building on this use of non-accounting data, 
Lebas (1996, 93) notes that  
 
  The Tableau de Bord is different from the information documents that arise from 
a responsibility accounting system. Its purpose is not to account for what has been 
done, but to provide information about the status, future, present, and recent past 
of each of the key success factors for each responsibility centre and for the firm as 
a whole. 
 
  Although the emphasis within the early version of Higher Control was on the use 
of financial data, Rose was equally aware of the importance of non-financial data. Indeed, 
he recognised that control statistics needed to be of two kinds, physical and monetary 
(Rose 1934, 27). Physical data, it was considered, should relate to production, stock and 
sales, while monetary data should relate to the costs of production, sales and 
administration respectively, together with sales turnover and profit or loss (Rose 1934, 
27-28). It was further indicated that (Rose 1934, 28): 
 
  the physical statements should work up to a culminating figure; that figure should 
be expressed in terms of money, and that financial figure should form the link 
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Whilst the earliest editions of Higher Control emphasised that the business 
position would be measured purely in financial terms, under operating controls we 
nevertheless find the use of non-monetary statistics, especially in relation to the „human 
and technical sides‟ of operations. Like all aspects of the method, the range of non-
financial data which was advocated increased over time. In later years, on the personnel 
side this included data on the number of employees, daily absenteeism, hours worked, 
performance levels, accident rates and labour turnover, whilst on the technical side (Rose 
and Farr 1957, 70-75) we find things like the ratio of incentive labour to that on day-rate, 
utilization of specific machines or groups of machines, total machine-hours lost, plus, on 
the materials side, data on stocks of finished goods, raw materials, and work in process. 
Despite this, it could nevertheless be argued that the balance within Higher Control was 
more in favour of accounting information than is the case in the tableau de bord approach 
though, as Pezet has shown, the nature of tableaux de bord, and especially the balance 
between financial and non-financial data, varied as between companies and changed over 
time, just as did the conceptualisation of Higher Control. 
  Although Rose never refers in his work to the tableau de bord approach, and may 
not even have been aware of it, he was aware of certain developments in France, most 
particularly the ideas of Henri Fayol. In the preface to the first edition in 1934 Rose 
admitted that while he and Pollen had been working on the method of Higher Control in 
the late 1920s, they had been unaware of Fayol‟s ideas, but this had changed with the 
publication in 1929 of an English translation of Administration Industrielle et Générale 
(Rose 1934, xi). Rose suggested that the method of Higher Control “may be accepted as 
an attempt to solve the problem that M. Fayol had evidently visualized years ago” (1934, 
xii). In the final edition of his work, Rose elaborated on the dual meaning of the word 
contrôle in French, noting that it went beyond the conventional English use of the term as 
“the power of directing” to also mean “to examine, to inspect, or to check against some 
predetermined standard or limit” (1968, 27). For Rose, these two aspects of control, as 
enshrined within the French word contrôle, encapsulated the two key elements, as he saw 
them, of Higher Control: first, the setting up of a plan and the creation of an information 
system by which its attainment can be monitored; and second, the taking of action, by the 
managing director, on the basis of the information obtained so as “to maintain the 
progress of the business towards the desired result for the working year” (1968, 27). In 
this sense, Rose therefore saw Higher Control as embracing elements of strategy in the 





It has been seen above that while there are important differences between the concepts of 
the tableau de bord, budgetary control and Higher Control, there are also many 
similarities and/or overlaps. These similarities arise, in large measure, because the 
concepts and tools associated with the three concepts were developed in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as part of a similar process in France, the USA 
and Britain, namely, the systematisation of management. Within this movement, there 
were two important emphases: first, the use of statistical information, both financial and 
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single direction); and second, the use of graphs to present such data. Businesses in 
Britain, France and the USA therefore began to utilise methods which embraced these 
developments, though there is evidence which suggests that they may have done so in 
different ways and, possibly, to different degrees. Whilst it might be tempting to associate 
a single technique with a specific country, e.g. budgetary control with the USA, tableau 
de bord with France and, possibly, Higher Control with Britain, on the basis of the 
evidence presented above such a categorisation would clearly be too simplistic. Given 
that the precise extent of the use of each of these techniques at particular points in time is 
not known with any degree of accuracy, all that can be concluded is that there is some 
evidence of local methods of managerial control being developed in each country, and 
existing alongside those developed in other countries. Each of these methods represented 
a local variation on the implementation of a set of common ideas which stemmed from a 
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Appendix – A brief biography of Thomas Gerald Rose (1886-1963) 
 
Rose was born in 1886 and educated at Marlborough School in Britain and the 
Realgymnazium of Darmstadt, in Germany, where he was trained as an engineer (The 
Times 1963, p.14), subsequently becoming a member of both the Institute of Mechanical 
Engineers and the Institute of Production Engineers. Between 1911 and 1919, according 
to his obituarist, Rose was a shop manager at the engineering firm Armstrong-Whitworth, 
moving in the latter year to become works manager of Leyland Motors Ltd. where he 
remained until 1925. Having obtained 15 years of experience, the exact period of time he 
was later to claim was vital for someone wishing to become an industrial consultant, 
Rose moved into free-lance consultancy work, practicing his new business from a base in 
London. 
  During the 1920s, Rose also began to take an active role in the education of future 
managers. In 1925-26, Rose undertook the presentation of a lecture course (a series of 25 
lectures - Rose 1954, 57) for the second year syllabus of the Institute of Industrial 
Administration (IIA) on „Workshop organisation and Management‟ at the Regent Street 
Polytechnic in London. In January 1930 Rose commenced a course on manufacturing 
management in an engineering context on the Third Year Tripos at the Engineering 
Department of Cambridge University (Rose 1954, 64; Brech 1997, 46). In these courses, 
Rose presumably expounded on the ideas which he had been developing during his 
periods of working for Armstrong-Whitworth and Leyland Motors, and which had 
prompted him to go into consultancy work. According to Brech (1997, 546 NR40), Rose 
“had pioneered systematic methods of applying a company‟s internal data for structured 
control of operational and financial performance”. These ideas, which involved the use of 
charts for presentational purposes, received one of their first public airings at a meeting 
of the Junior Institution of Engineers in 1927 (the paper subsequently being published in 
Cassier’s Magazine late in 1929). This formed the basis of his work, Business Charts, 
published in 1930.
23  
  Perhaps not surprisingly, Rose continued to develop his ideas and, four months 
after having been admitted as a fellow of the IIA
24, on 19 May 1931, he presented an 
address to the IIA membership entitled „Higher Control‟ (Rose 1954, 66). Two days later, 
Rose was co-opted on the Council of the IIA, becoming a member of the Institute‟s 
Syllabus Committee on 26 November 1931, and was elected vice-chairman of the IIA at 
the Council Meeting held on 14 March 1932 (Rose 1954, 67-9). The following day Rose 
presented another paper to the IIA membership, this time entitled „The Management 
Audit‟ (Rose 1954, 71). This latter paper was published later the same year by Gee and 
Co. as a 47-page monograph with a foreword by A.S. Comyns-Carr, the President of the 
IIA who had chaired the session at which Rose had presented the paper. The work was 
eventually published in three editions, appearing in 1932, 1944 and 1961 (the third 
edition also being reprinted in 1965), and its key message was the need for firms to 
undertake an annual audit of management, mirroring what happened with the annual 
                                                 
23  Business Charts appeared in four further editions between 1935 and 1957: 2
nd – 1935; 3
rd – 1936; 4
th – 
1949; 5
th – 1957. 
24 Two fellows, constituting the 38
th and 39
th fellows, one of them being Rose, were elected on 27 January 
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audit of the financial accounts. Comyns-Carr noted that (Rose 1944, viii – reprint of 
foreword to 1
st edition)  
 
in setting out to demonstrate the practicality of this idea and to indicate methods 
by which it could be carried out he has given in concise and intelligible form a 
brilliant epitome of the fundamental principles of industrial management in their 
application to every branch of an industrial undertaking…. 
 
Although the work was mainly aimed at larger industrial undertakings, Rose also 
indicated how the principles could be applied to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
  Although there are clear indications of some of Rose‟s more specific ideas for 
managerial control contained within The Management Audit, its short length clearly did 
not give him the scope to explain the fullness of those ideas. These, however, were given 
fuller rein two years later with the publication, in 1934, of Higher Control. A Manual for 
Company Directors, Secretaries and Accountants. The significance of the work is 
reflected in the fact that, over the next thirty years or so, it appeared in seven editions, not 
to mention numerous reprints.
25 It should be pointed out that, in addition to Business 
Charts and Higher Control, Rose published a series of other works reflecting his views 
on management in the 1940s and 1950s: The Mensuration of Management (1946); The 
Internal Finance of Industrial Undertakings (1947); and Top-Management Accounting (a 
70-page work published in 1957). In addition, in 1954, A History of the Institute of 
Industrial Administration, 1919-1951, authored by Rose was published by the IIA, of 
which Rose had been vice-chairman from 1932-37 and chairman 1938-43.
26 
 




                                                 
25 The various editions of the book, published by Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd., appeared as follows: 2
nd 
edition -1935; 3
rd – 1938; 4
th - 1944; 5
th – 1950; 6
th – 1957; 7
th – 1963; 1967 (first paperback edition) With 
the fourth edition, first published in 1944, the title was changed to Higher Control in Management; A 
Method of Presenting the Facts and Figures of Industrial and Commercial Undertakings so that they can 
be used for the Purpose of Management. A paperback version of the 7
th edition appeared in 1967, after 
Rose‟s death, and was reprinted in 1968. The text was also published in France in 1959, under the title La 
gestion de l’entreprise a la plus élevé (translated by Charles Voraz and published in Paris by Editions de 
l‟Entreprise moderne). An American text, entitled simply Higher Management Control, co-authored with 
Donald E. Farr, was published in the USA by McGraw-Hill in 1957. 
26 The IIA was founded in 1919 by E.T. Elbourne and lost its separate identity in 1951 when it merged with 
the recently created British Institute of Management (BIM), becoming the BIM‟s General Management 
Professional Institute (Rose 1954, 177). 
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